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ABSTRACT
In the scheme of things, the 1996 Federal Agricultural Improvement and Reform Act
(FAIR) contained important breaks with a tradition of crop-by-crop subsidies dating back to the
Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933.  It freed many producers of "program commodities" (maize,
grain sorghum, wheat, barley, oats, cotton and rice) from a system of crop-specific base acre
accounting, merged these accounts into a single "whole farm base," and allowed production of
any but a few crops on these lands.  Overall, the freedom to produce in direct response to market
forces, rather than on the basis of crop-by-crop subsidies, as well as the budget discipline of
predetermined payments, were important steps in the direction of decoupled lump-sum
compensation.  Yet from the point of view of advocates of policy reform, FAIR represents an
unfinished agenda.  A variety of problems and issues remain.  First, the coverage of "freedom to
farm" is only partial, with numerous commodities left out of the decoupling program.  Second,
those critical of the distributive impacts of the commodity programs find little to cheer about in
the new contracts, and consider the acronym FAIR ironic.  Supply responses induced by price
levels in the first two years of FAIR have led to substantially lower prices and marketing receipts
in 1998.  A call has now gone up to resuscitate some form of safety net, such as a return to
deficiency payments or an extension and increase in contract payments under the 1996 Act.  It is
appropriate to move now to finish the unfinished agenda of the 1996 Act by implementing a long
term safety net based on some form of revenue assurance (á la Cochrane and Runge, 1992).￿
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1.  FAIR and Farm Policy
In the scheme of things, the 1996 Federal Agricultural Improvement and Reform Act
(FAIR) contained important breaks with a tradition of crop-by-crop subsidies dating back to the
Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933 (see Stuart and Runge, 1997).  It freed many producers of
"program commodities" (maize, grain sorghum, wheat, barley, oats, cotton and rice) from a
system of crop-specific base acre accounting, merged these accounts into a single "whole farm
base," and allowed production of any but a few crops on these lands.  Through such "freedom to
farm" provisions, payments to farmers were thus decoupled from these crops.  Farmers with
recorded base acres were given the opportunity (which nearly all accepted) to sign a seven-year
"contract" with the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), under which payments will be
continued on the merged base acres on a declining schedule until the year 2002.  By fixing these
future obligations on a per-acre basis, the floating obligations implied by the previous system of
deficiency payments were ended (for now), resulting in agricultural subsidies that are no longer
open ended entitlements to future payments from the Federal Treasury.  While signers of the
contract with USDA were entitled for seven years to a per-acre payment (whether or not they
produce a crop), the total amount of these obligations was fixed at $35.6 billion and therefore
predictable from a budgetary point of view.  Overall, the freedom to produce in direct response to
market forces, rather than on the basis of crop-by-crop subsidies, as well as the budget discipline
of predetermined payments, were important steps in the direction of decoupled lump-sum
compensation.￿
Yet from the point of view of advocates of policy reform, FAIR represents an unfinished
agenda.  A variety of problems and issues remain.  First, the coverage of "freedom to farm" is
only partial, with numerous commodities left out of the decoupling program.  The mechanisms
under which producers of these absent commodities (dairy products, sugar, peanuts and tobacco) 
receive compensation (and they differ) represent relatively low budget exposure, reinforcing their
backburner status.  Second, those critical of the distributive impacts of the commodity programs
find little to cheer about in the new contracts, and consider the acronym FAIR ironic.  A recent
analysis of payments offered to corn growers under the 1996 legislation concluded that when
these payments are compared with an equal degree of protection afforded by a portfolio of put
options contracts, corn growers will be overpaid between $2.9 billion and $12.7 billion over the
seven years of FAIR for switching to a decoupled system (Stinson, Coggins and Ramezani, 1998).
As in the past, those who have accumulated the largest eligibility through combined
acreage bases will receive the largest payments, effectively limited only to $80,000 per operation. 
Since these payments will be made over and above any marketing receipts, the largest producers
will augment their already significant receipts with generous lump sum transfers from USDA. 
This will further reinforce the concentration of roughly 90 percent of receipts and payments in the
hands of the 100,000-200,000 largest producers of field crops.  While 1996 market prices were
near all-time highs due to short grain stocks world-wide, making it difficult to justify such
transfers on grounds other than pure political expediency, recent market price declines have made
contract payments slightly less egregious from a distributive perspective.  A related issue is
whether the contract payments, once decoupled from specific crops, should necessarily be
completely divorced from market receipts.  An alternative would be to make them countercyclical,
so that payments are made in times of low marketing receipts and recede in high times (see6JG HQNNQYKPI OCVGTKCN KU FTCYP HTQO 5VWCTV CPF 4WPIG ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿
Cochrane and Runge, 1992).  Fourth, political realists tend to doubt that the end of the seven-year
contract will actually terminate transfers to these producers, as advertised.  Careful observers of
the Congressional Budget Office "scoring" of spending have noted that $4 billion remains in the
2002 budget for commodity programs, despite the alleged end of contract payments in that year.
Supply responses induced by price levels in the first two years of FAIR have led to
substantially lower prices and marketing receipts in 1998.  In a recent analysis of Minnesota net
farm income, Olson reports substantial declines off of the high levels of 1996-97, with corn prices
received off 15 percent, soybeans off 18 percent, beef 5 percent, and hogs a whopping 29 percent
lower.  Only milk prices have increased (by 10 percent), reflecting a global shortage of butterfat
(Olson, 1998).  A call has now gone up to resuscitate some form of safety net, such as a return to
deficiency payments or an extension and increase in contract payments under the 1996 Act. 
Farmers and their representatives have again emerged as special pleaders, willing to extend
indefinitely a system of transfers from the public purse, despite signing a seven-year contract that
was supposed to lead to a transition to the market.  It is appropriate to move now to finish the
unfinished agenda of the 1996 Act by implementing a long term safety net based on some form of
revenue assurance (á la Cochrane and Runge, 1992).
Before discussing such an approach, I will summarize the main features of the 1996
legislation.
2.  Summary of 1996 Farm Bill -- Major Provisions
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President Clinton signed the Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform Act of 1996
(FAIR) on April 4, 1996, following a protracted, politically charged legislative process.  The 1996￿
Farm Bill contains nine titles:  the Agricultural Market Transition Act, containing the majority of
its reforms; as well as titles on agricultural trade; conservation; nutrition assistance; agricutural
promotion; credit; rural development; research, extension, and development; and a miscellaneous
title.
2.1  Title I:  Agricultural Market Transition Act (Freedom to Farm)
Title I, the Agricultural Market Transition Act (AMTA), contains many elements of the
vetoed 1995 Freedom to Farm Act (FFA).  In shorthand, this title establishes the production
contracts for wheat, feed grains, cotton and rice discussed above.  In addition, it continues non-
recourse loans, amends the dairy program, extends the peanut and sugar programs with minimal
alterations, describes administration of the title, temporarily suspends permanent law regarding
price support authority, establishes the Commission on 21st Century Production Agriculture, and
includes other commodity provisions.
The AMTA contains most of the reform elements in the 1996 Farm Bill.  Through the
creation of transition payments contained in seven-year production flexibility contracts, the Act
decouples subsidies from the crop grown.  It also caps spending on agricultural subsides at $35.6
billion, over seven years, thus removing them in the aggregate from the entitlement category.  In
this sense, the AMTA fundamentally changes the way in which farm subsidies for the affected
crops operate.  The previous system, parts of which dated back to the Great Depression, provided
program crop farmers with income support in the form of "deficiency payments," calculated on
the basis of recorded crop acreage and government-set target prices.  When the market prices fell
below the target price, farmers received deficiency payments equal to the difference in price to
augment their income.  In return for this protection, the government sought to control the supply’XGTV 8CP FGT 5NWKU CPF 9KNNKU 2GVGTUQP ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ CV VJG 7PKXGTUKV[ QH /KPPGUQVC￿ TGEGPVN[
￿
EQORNGVGF C FGVCKNGF GXCNWCVKQP QH VJG KORCEV QH ETQR UGV￿CUKFGU QP TWTCN GORNQ[OGPV CPF
QWVOKITCVKQP￿ 7UKPI ￿￿ [GCTU QH FCVC HTQO ￿￿￿ TCPFQON[ UGNGEVGF HCTOKPI￿FGRGPFGPV 7￿5￿
EQWPVKGU ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ VJG UVWF[ HQWPF VJCV VJG NCTIGT VJG PWODGT QH FKXGTVGF CETGU KP C EQWPV[￿
VJG UOCNNGT VJG FGOCPF HQT IQQFU CPF UGTXKEGU UWRRNKGF D[ VJG TWTCN PQPHCTO RQRWNCVKQP￿ 6JG
PGICVKXG KORCEVU QP TWTCN EQOOWPKVKGU CRRGCTGF VQ QWVYGKIJ CP[ RTKEG￿GPJCPEKPI GHHGEVU QH
CETGCIG FKXGTUKQPU￿
￿
of program crops through acreage reduction programs (ARP) (see Young and Shields, 1996;
Cochrane and Runge, 1992).  This combination of simultaneous support and control led to serious
distortions in farming methods and the agricultural economy.
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In contrast, the AMTA establishes seven-year production flexibility contracts with fixed
transition payments as the income support mechanism for farmers.  Eligible farmers include those
who participated in programs for wheat, feed grains, cotton and rice during the past five years. 
The Act eliminates income support deficiency payments, target prices, underplanting provisions,
acreage reduction programs (ARP's), and the Farmer Owned Reserve Program (Hallberg, 1996). 
In doing so, it severs the connection between subsidies and current farm prices.
In addition, increased planting flexibility arises from the separation of  eligible program
acres from the crops planted on the acres.  Under production flexibility contracts, 85 percent of
1996 base acreage computed under the 1990 Farm Bill (plus or minus Conservation Reserve
Program [CRP] acres) determines payment acres.  Under the production flexibility contract
guidelines, farmers may plant any commodity they choose with limitations only on fruits and
vegetables.  For example, a farmer with 100 acres of program wheat receives 85 payment acres of
wheat whether that farmer plants wheat, corn, hay, or soybeans (Salathe and Langley, 1996).  The
new system ends the Farmer Owned Reserve (FOR) and thus removes the government as a
stockholder of commodities.  Because the government no longer accumulates these commodities￿
through the FOR or loan programs, a much more limited reserve capacity exists in the event of
sudden shortages.
In addition to decoupling farm subsidies from cropping obligations, the AMTA caps total
annual payments.  The Act limits fiscal year total expenditures to $5.6 billion in 1996, $5.4 billion
in 1997, $5.8 billion in 1998, $5.6 billion in 1999, $5.1 billion in 2000, $4.1 billion in 2001, and
$4 billion in 2002, thus ending the open-ended entitlement of previous legislation (Figure 1). 
While payments decline after 1998 until 2002, they are generally constant until then.  Spending on
the basis of previous crop-specific base acreage is prorated, so that 26.26 percent of total funds
will go to acres previously enrolled as wheat base, 46.22 percent as corn, 5.11 percent as
sorghum, 2.16 percent as barley, 0.15 percent as oats, 11.63 percent as upland cotton, and 8.47
percent as rice (Figure 2).  The annual payment rate for each crop depends on the total payment
to be allocated, divided by the estimated eligible production.   Within the crop allocation, farmers
receive 85 percent of contract acreage multiplied by the farm program contract yield multiplied by
the annual payment rate.  ￿￿
Each individual farmer faces a contract limit of $40,000 or $80,000 using the "three entity rule,"
which allows a relative to increase eligibility to the higher amount.  To see how this would work
for an individual farmer holding 100 contract wheat acres consider the following example:
Example:  Suppose a farmer holds 100 contract acres, the following USDA
example calculates the farmer's 1996 payment for wheat acres (Salathe and
Langley, 1996):
Farm Contract Acres:  100
Contract Payment Acres:  100 (.85) = 85
Payment Production:  2,890
Program Yield:  2,890/85 = 34
Estimated payment rate for 1996:  .94
Estimated Payment:  (.94) (85) (34) = $2,717.00
It should be noted that 100 acres of wheat base is a relatively small amount.  The average
wheat farm in the United States in 1992 had an acreage of 202, but most commercial operations
are larger than this average (USDA, 1995).  Production flexibility contracts require compliance
with conservation, wetland protection, and planting flexibility requirements.  In brief, these
stipulate that a conservation plan be maintained, that designated wetlands and erosion-prone soils
not be disturbed, and that no fruits or vegetables be grown.  In addition, compliance requires
agricultural use of program acres, precluding development for nonagricultural uses such as
vacation homes.  The 1996 Farm Bill adds an early out option for some land in the Conservation
Reserve Program (CRP) held by farmers who have signed the seven-year production flexibility
contracts.￿
Contract holders remain eligible for non-recourse loans with marketing loan provisions as
under the 1990 farm bill (see Vande Kamp and Runge, 1994).  However, the Act caps the wheat
and corn loan rates at relatively low 1995 levels and sets correspondingly low loan rates for
sorghum, barley, oats, cotton, rice, oilseeds and soybeans.  The programs for cotton and rice also
retain government price guarantees by setting loan rate floor prices.  The Act sets the minimum
price for cotton at $0.50 per pound and for rice at $6.50 per cwt.  Individual producers of these
crops face maximum marketing loan gains of $150,000 under the three entity rule.  Loan
deficiency payments continue on all loan commodities excluding ELS cotton.  However, since
loan rates are so low and current market prices so high, these payments will generally be small or
zero.
The AMTA alters the dairy program through changes to price supports, milk marketing
orders, and dairy export programs. Dairy price support alterations include the cessation of
government assessments on dairy producers (which had been equal to 11.25 cents per
hundredweight under the 1990 farm bill), phasing out price supports for butter, cheese, and
powdered milk over four years, establishment of a recourse loan program and continuation of the
Fluid Milk Promotion Program.  The Act provides for the consolidation of the current 33 milk
marketing regions into from 10-14 regions.  It also consents to the Northeast Interstate Dairy
Compact, a regional price-fixing scheme demanded in return for his support of the final bill by the
leading minority member of the Senate Agriculture Committee from Vermont.  Application of the
scheme was subject to a finding of "compelling public interest" on the part of the Secretary of
Agriculture, which he dutifully fulfilled in late 1996, opening the provision to court challenges
from upper-Midwest producers in Minnesota and Wisconsin.  The Act also continues the Dairy
Export Incentive Program.￿￿
Despite innovations in wheat, feed grains, cotton and rice, the AMTA continues the price
supports for tobacco without change and leaves the peanut and sugar programs largely intact. 
The minimal changes to the peanut and sugar programs illustrate the continuation of market
distorting policies, although a small achievement was the elimination of the honey program, which
had a small but well-subsidized constituency.
Modest revisions transform the peanut program into a “no net cost” to the government
program, analogous to the sugar program.  While the program operates as “no net cost” to the
government, it costs American consumers several hundred million dollars a year in terms of higher
product prices (Rauch, 1996).  The sugar program itself continues as a “no net cost” program,
although it was modestly adjusted by freezing the sugar loan rate, terminating marketing
allotments, transforming the non-recourse loan program to a recourse loan program when import
levels drop, and increasing the assessments on sugar processors by 25 percent.  The principle
device supporting domestic prices continues:  tariff-rate quotas for sugar imports that keep
domestic sugar prices high.  Like the peanut program, “no net cost” in sugar policy refers to
budget expenditures, however, American consumers pay approximately $1 billion a year in higher
prices (Rauch, 1996).
Other commodity provisions include: the authorization of the Options Pilot Program in
which farmers are subsidized to participate in hedging production risks in futures and options
markets.  More broadly, provisions exist to support risk management education and the
establishment of an Office of Risk Management.  As part of this complex of risk management
approaches, provisions direct the implementation of the Revenue Insurance Pilot Program, which
some feel may be a prototype for future income support policies.  However, a separate provision
drops the requirement that farmers enroll in crop insurance programs, provided they waive their￿￿
rights to emergency crop loss assistance.  In effect, this preserves the political opportunity of the
Congress to use "emergency relief" as a form of transfer to constituents adversely affected by
weather, wind and floods.
In summary, Title I changes the mechanism providing farm income support to some key
program crops from deficiency payments to transition payments, caps farm spending, but leaves
numerous commodities largely unaffected.  In the face of more market orientation, a greater
emphasis is also given to risk management tools.  However, much of the past law remains in the
dairy, sugar and peanut programs as well at  the continuation of non-recourse loans and the
retention of permanent law.
2.2  Title II:  Agricultural Trade
Title II amends the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954 and
Related Statutes, amends the Agricultural Trade Act of 1978, and contains additional agricultural
trade provisions.  Part of the impetus for adjustments in these parts of the Farm Bill was the 1993
Uruguay Round agreement in agriculture, which required a revision of spending and the volume
of grain subsidized for export.  The new legislation amends the 1978 Trade Act by continuing the
Export Credit Guarantee Programs, capping annual spending on the Export Enhancement
Program at $3.2 billion over the seven years, limiting spending on the Market Access Program
(the renamed Market Promotion Program) to $90 million, providing embargo compensation under
specific circumstances and authorizing first time statutory authority for the Foreign Market
Development Program.
Under amendments to the 1954 Trade Act the FAIR act also extends authority for the
Food for Peace (PL 480) program, a long-standing foreign assistance program and vent for U.S.￿￿
surpluses.  It expands PL 480 program eligibility for low-interest food loans to private entities as
well as foreign governments, and increases PL 480 program funding from $13.5 million to $28
million in order to cover administration costs.  Other amendments affecting food aid policy
include extension of authority for the Food for Progress Program, replacement of the Food
Security Wheat Reserve with the Food Security Commodity Reserve, and increased funding for
the Farmer to Farmer Program.  Under the Food Security Commodity Reserve, the commodities
that compose the four million metric ton reserve are expanded from wheat to include any
combination of wheat, rice, corn or sorghum.  In addition, the change increased the amount
eligible, per fiscal year, for release to assist overseas relief efforts from 300,000 to 500,000 metric
tons.  Additional agricultural trade provisions include authorization for the Emerging Markets
Program and direction for a new USDA trade strategy.  The title also repeals several Agricultural
Acts concerning trade.
2.3  Title III:  Conservation
Title III extends and alters existing programs, creates new initiatives and broadens the
conservation agenda with $2.2 billion in additional funding (Hallberg, 1996).  The Act retains
conservation compliance provisions in relation to transition payments and other eligibility for cost-
sharing and insurance coverage from WPA (see Title I above).  It also clarifies the definitions
under the land conservation ("sodbuster") provisions, broadens wetland authority, extends the
Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) for seven years, maintains "swampbuster" provisions, and
continues the Wetlands Reserve Program (WRP) for seven years.  Among the most significant
changes are efforts to better target the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP), which since 1985
has held more than 36 million acres out of active crop production.  In a period of low stocks and￿￿
high prices, there is pressure to bring much of this land back into production.  Changes to the
CRP include capping the maximum allowed CRP area at 36.4 million acres, strengthening the
criteria regarding eligible land, and providing an early out option for land outside of
environmentally sensitive areas.  The new legislation caps the maximum WRP area at 975,000
acres.  Beginning in 1997, it splits the area into three equal categories of permanent easements,
30-year easements, and restoration cost-share agreements.
New programs funded under Title III include the Environmental Quality Incentives
Program (EQIP), Conservation Farm Option (CFO),  Grazing Lands Conservation Initiative,
Wildlife Habitat Incentive Program, Farmland Protection Program,  an initiative for frequently
flooded cropland, Everglades Ecosystem Restoration, and the National Natural Resources
Conservation Foundation.  EQIP combines the Agricultural Conservation Program, Water Quality
Incentives Program, Great Plains Conservation Program, and the Colorado River Basin Salinity
Control Program in order to coordinate the provision of  technical assistance and funding for
cost-sharing or financial incentives connected with conservation and environmental practices.  The
new law provides EQIP with $1.3 billion in funding over the seven-year period.
In addition, the title establishes the Environmental Conservation Acreage Reserve
Program (ECARP) to house the Conservation Reserve, Wetland Reserve and Environmental
Quality Incentives Programs.  Furthermore, by including the Wildlife Habitat Incentives Program,
the title widens the conservation focus of the Farm Bill.
2.4  Title IV:  Nutrition Assistance
Title IV reauthorizes the Food Stamp Program (FSP) and other smaller nutrition
programs.  The new law extends the Food Stamp Program for only two years due to the inclusion￿￿
of the program in current welfare reform efforts.  Other programs continue for seven years
including the Commodity Supplemental Food Program (CSFP), Soup Kitchen and Food Bank,
Temporary Emergency Food Assistance Program (TEFAP), Commodity Distribution Program,
Puerto Rico Nutrition Assistance Program, American Samoa Assistance Program and National
Commodity Processing Program.  Separate legislation in 1994 extended the school lunch and
Women, Infant, and Children (WIC) Programs.  These programs illustrate the substantial transfers
to dependent groups in the form of food assistance, especially in American territories such as
Puerto Rico and Samoa, but also to as many as one in nine Americans living in the 50 states.
2.5  Title V:  Agricultural Promotion
Title V authorizes the establishment of producer-funded programs for promotion,
research, and education regarding agricultural commodities.  The Act appropriates funds for the
promotion of canola and rapeseed, kiwi fruit, and popcorn as well as extending the program for
fluid milk.  The law provides the Agriculture Department with the authority to establish new
producer-funded promotion programs without prior congressional approval.
2.6  Title VI:  Credit
Title VI reauthorizes and revises farm loan programs, clarifies emergency loan assistance
and provides for a study of rural credit availability.  Among the issues addressed are the types of
loan assistance to be made available, eligibility for credit assistance, and treatment of delinquent
borrowers.  The Act distances credit from direct loans, in favor of guaranteeing loans (Hosansky,
1996).  New restrictions on the purpose and length of time for eligibility appear in the 1996 Farm
Bill and repeal authority to make loans for most nonagricultural purposes.  In addition, the Act￿￿
targets lending to beginning, rather than established, farmers and ranchers.  It authorizes lines-of-
credit for up to five years, providing additional loan opportunities for farmers.  However,
delinquent borrowers face tighter restructuring rules, collection practices and expedited sales of
forfeited property.  To qualify for emergency loan assistance, the law requires farmers to have
held hazard insurance at the time of the loss.  The Act limits emergency assistance loan amounts
to $500,000 per farmer.
Finally, Title VI provides for a study to examine the rural demand for credit and the
current capacity and future ability of the current infrastructure to meet demands.  As part of this
examination, the study will investigate the Federal Credit System (FCS), commercial banks, and
other federal agencies. 
2.7  Title VII:  Rural Development
Title VII consolidates existing rural development programs and establishes new programs
targeted at rural infrastructure development.  The Act provides $100 million annually for
telemedicine and distance learning services, in which medical expertise and teaching are routed
through new information systems to rural areas.  A renamed and reorganized Alternative
Agricultural Research and Commercialization Corporation, continues to make grants and loans
directed towards non-traditional, non-food farm and forest products, expanding industrial uses of
agricultural commodities.
A consolidated source of rural development funds was created in the Fund for Rural
America, with approved financing of $100 million annually for 1997-1999.  This fund provides
money in equal proportions for rural development projects, agricultural research, and
discretionary spending for rural development or research.  In addition, Title VII establishes the￿￿
Rural Community Advancement Program (RCAP).  RCAP reorganizes and expands rural
development infrastructure spending in three areas:  rural community facilities, rural utilities, and
rural business and cooperatives.  The legislation also authorizes $590 million for water and waste
facility loans and grants, provides $50 million in funding for the Rural Cooperative Development
Grant Program, authorizes the National Sheep Industry Improvement Center, and establishes a
Rural Venture Capital Demonstration Program.
2.8  Title VIII:  Research, Extension and Education
Title VIII provides broad reauthorization for existing programs, subject to appropriations
limits, from 1998-2002 (Young and Shields, 1996).  It appropriates funds for agricultural
research, extension, and education programs at 1995 levels through 1997.  The new legislation
establishes the National Agricultural Research, Extension, Education and Economics Advisory
Board.  Furthermore, the law directs the Agriculture Secretary to develop a system to monitor
research and extension projects.  The title expands animal health and disease research, repeals
authorization for a turkey research center, and authorizes research on human nutrition and citrus
fruit pests.   In addition, it provides for higher education research grants and amends the process
for reviewing proposals for agricultural research facilities.
2.9  Title IX:  Miscellaneous
Title IX provides guidelines for the humane transportation of horses, amends the Plant
Protection Variety Act, amends the Swine Health Protection Act, and provides for the collection
and use of agricultural quarantine and inspection fees.  It also establishes the Safe Meat and
Poultry Inspection Panel and provides for overseas inspections of agricultural imports.  Finally, it
authorizes operation of the USDA Graduate School as a non-appropriated, non-federal entity and
provides for the expenses of the USDA student internship program.,QJP 5EJPKVVMGT￿ 2GTUQPCN EQOOWPKECVKQP￿ 5GRVGODGT ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿￿
3.  Whither Farm Policy Now (1998)?
The Congressional elections of 1998 reminded many farm state legislators of the need to
tend to their flocks, especially as prices retreated in the face of surging production, declining
export demand, and high land rental rates (reflecting a string of previously good price years). 
Together these elements, and additional problems of disease (mainly scab) in Northern wheat-
growing regions, led to calls to re-open the 1996 FAIR legislation.  Two main schools of thought,
running essentially along party lines, predominated.  Democrats, who were largely dealt out of the
1996 debate, argued that FAIR had failed, and that a return to high loan rates and other forms of
traditional intervention in the farm economy were justified.  Republicans, while acknowledging the
increasing difficulty of some farmers, cautioned against opening the gates to changes, which could
threaten the gains made in the direction of decoupling and flexibility.  Senator Richard Lugar (R-
IN) argued on the Senate floor that farmers are generally in good financial condition despite
current low prices, following strong prices from 1995 to 1997 and high subsidies in 1996 and
1997.  The amendments proposed by the Democratic leadership would pay increased subsidies
principally to big farmers, he asserted, and little of the increased spending proposed would reach
the scattered farmers facing new financial difficulty.
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Between these two poles of partisan debate, there is room for recognition that the 1996
FAIR payments, because they bear no relation to annual changes in farm prices and incomes,
could be substantially better targeted than they are now.  These improvements in targeting could
take at least three forms:￿￿
(1) Countercyclicity, in the sense that payments would increase in inverse proportion
to declines in farm-level revenues.
(2) Progressivity, in the sense that larger farmers would be more limited in the total
level of subsidy received.
(3) Regionality, in the sense that payments would be adjusted to reflect differences in
geographic growing regions.
While it is hardly the only proposal for reform, Cochrane and Runge (1992) advocated a
plan which contained all these elements, at the same time that it advocated decoupling and budget
restraint, which FAIR incorporated.  The proposal involved an income stabilization payment,
based on the relationship of the Index of Prices Paid to the Index of Prices Received for a regional
basket of commodities.  This payment has several features that bear emphasis.  First, the payment
is intended to provide an income safety net in periods of deteriorating terms of trade for the farm
sector.  It does not exist to support farm income through good times and bad.  It exists to
stabilize farm income when prices paid out for feed, seed, fertilizer, interest on debt to plant a
crop, and fuel costs are rising and/or prices received for the basket of regional commodities are
falling.  When the terms of trade are improving, the payments would disappear.  A three-year
moving average of Prices Received and Prices Paid would be calculated annually by the USDA
for the six main regions of the country (Northeast, Northcentral, Southeast, Great Plains,
Mountain and Pacific Coast).  For each of these regions, the percentage change in each of the
indices in a given year from the previous year would be calculated.  (It is also possible to calculate
these indices for smaller geographic areas if finer distinctions in the types of agriculture practiced
are needed.)  Whenever the percentage measure of change for the Index of Prices Paid exceeded￿￿
the percentage measure of change for the Index of Prices Received, a stabilization payment to
eligible farmers would be triggered.  It is reasonable to conclude that the stabilization payment
arrived at for a given year could actually be paid to farmers in the first quarter of the following
year.  The trigger to either make, or not make, payments in a given year would be based on the
pricing behavior of the previous three years, both with respect to prices paid and received.  Thus,
if the terms of trade deteriorated for two years, then improved for one, then deteriorated once
again, payments would not stop abruptly in response to the transitory improvement, but only
when the improvement was sustained for several years.
The above point, and the entire procedure for calculating changes in the terms of trade
may be reviewed in Table 1.  The index values of Prices Received and Prices Paid in Table 1 are
hypothetical; but they are also representative in a general way of the behavior of those two classes
of prices.  The index values of Prices Received fluctuate importantly and irregularly.  The index
values of Prices Paid increase steadily over time.  Given the index values of prices Received and
Prices Paid in columns 1 and 4 of Table 1, the three-year moving averages of those indices are
presented in columns 2 and 5.  Given the three year moving average values for each year, the
percentage changes in a given year from the previous year are presented in columns 3 and 6.  In
year 4, for example, the percentage change in the three-year moving average from year 3 to year 4
for the index of Prices Received is equal to .88; while the percentage change in the three-year
moving average from year 3 to year 4 for the index of Prices Paid is equal to 1.047.  Whenever
the value of column 6 exceeds the value of column 3, a payment is triggered.  In our example,
the terms of trade turned against farmers in year 4, and they are entitled to a stabilization
payment.  In the hypothetical time series of Prices Received and Prices Paid presented in Table 1,
farmers would have been entitled to stabilization payments  in 7 out of the 11 years for which￿￿
computations were made (or in each of the years for which the percentage changes in column 3
are boldfaced).￿￿
Table 1.  Hypothetical Illustration of Index Trigger System
                                                                                                            
                       Prices Received                                        Prices Paid
                                                                                                               
3-Year 3-Year
Index Moving Trigger Index Moving Trigger
a,b a
Year Value Average Value Value Average Value
                                                                                                            
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
  1 100 100
  2  90 105
  3  80  90 110 105
  4  70  80  .88 115 110 1.047
c
  5  80  76.6  .95 120 115 1.045
  6  70  73.3  .95 125 120 1.043
  7  90  80.0 1.09 130 125 1.041
  8  60  73.3  .916 135 130 1.04
  9  50  66.6  .908 140 135 1.038
 10  80  63.3  .950 145 140 1.037
 11  90  73.3 1.157 150 145 1.035
 12 100  90.0 1.227 155 150 1.034
 13 110 100.0 1.111 160 155 1.033
 14 120 110.0 1.1 165 160 1.032
 15 110 113.3 1.027 170 165 1.031
                                                                                                            
The value in year 4 of this column is the percentage change that the three-year moving
a
average of year 4 is of the three-year moving average of year 3; and so on through the years.
The boldface numbers indicate that stabilization payments would be made in those years.
b
The trigger value for Prices Received in year 4 is less than the trigger value of Prices
c
Paid, hence a stabilization payment would be made in year 4.
Source:  Cochrane and Runge (1992), p. 123.￿￿
How would these stabilization payments be made to eligible farmers and how much would
each farmer be eligible to receive?  We proposed that payments be made on a per acre basis on
the farmer's "whole farm base," the same base on which FAIR payments are now made.  The level
of payment per acre should be set so as to reflect, as near as budget and program limitations
permit, the declining revenue stream resulting from the deteriorating terms of trade in that
agricultural region.  We recognized that this payment level would be a political number. 
However, it can and should be accompanied by a hard and fast program limitation of a total
payment per farm per year of $20,000; and by a maximum amount fixed in the federal budget
each year available for distribution as farm income stabilization payments, as under FAIR.  It
bears emphasis that the main argument against payment limits has always been that large farmers
would not then participate in the programs, and that acreage reduction programs (ARPs) would
have little impact.  Now that ARPs are history, one of the main arguments against payment limits
is gone.
The combined effect of the Cochrane-Runge payment trigger system, payment limits set at
$20,000 per farm (contrasted with current limits of $80,000) and regional determination of safety
net payments is to:  
(a) introduce clear countercyclicity into FAIR; 
(b) convert FAIR payments from a regressive to a progressive system; and 
(c) target these FAIR payments regionally.
The potential effects of these stabilization payment levels can be visualized in the following
examples.  A 500 (payment) acre farm base, drawn up on the basis of FAIR acreage eligibility,
would translate into a stabilization payment for that farm of $5,000 if the per acre payment rate
were set at $10.00; and, if the per acre payment rate rose to $40, the total payment to that farm￿￿
would rise to the limit of $20,000.  If there were 500,000 farms in the U.S. with a 500 acre "farm
base" (which is a generous figure), the total federal expenditure for stabilization payments would
amount to $2.5 billion at a $10 per acre payment rate; and, at a $40 per acre payment rate the
total federal expenditure would be $10 billion.  Stabilization payment rates would most likely vary
between zero and 40 dollars per acre.  Further, since it is unlikely that the terms of trade would
turn against farmers to the same degree in all six regions at one time, it is possible, even probable,
that the payment rate per acre might be zero in one region, $10 in another region and $30 or $40
in another region.  This scheme recognizes that there are important variations in economic
conditions among farming regions.
In addition to its countercyclicity, progressivity, and regionality, two other important
effects of this income stabilization scheme should be noted.  First, although the program does not
provide a permanent income subsidy to commercial farmers, it does protect farmers against
dramatic declines in income on an ongoing basis, beyond the year 2002.  Thus, it should be much
easier for commercial farmers to obtain production credit than would be the case in the essentially
laissez-faire setting envisioned, at least rhetorically, when FAIR terminates in 2002.  The program
eliminates part of the income risks from farming, but payment limits of $20,000 still encourage the
use of other risk-management tools, including crop insurance and futures and options contracts. 
Second, the program greatly reduces the unpredictable aspect of agricultural program
expenditures in the federal budget by placing a cap, as does FAIR, on the income stabilization
payment expenditures.  Unlike FAIR, however, this program would not terminate in the year
2002.￿￿
4.  Conclusions
The November elections of 1998, like any election cycle, concentrated political attention
on the farm sector.  Falling farm prices, together with regional experiences with disease and
drought, have led to calls to reform FAIR.  There are, in fact, substantial reasons to consider
amendments to the 1996 farm legislation.  These include the need for a more countercyclical
stabilization payments, greater progressivity, and attention to the problems of specific regional
interests.  In addition, the commodity coverage of FAIR merits attention, as well as the specific
calculation of eligibility for program payments.  Although many defenders of FAIR argue that
opening up the program to revision carries risks, so does maintaining it with the flaws outlined
above.  If these flaws persist, they may erode support for its most important innovations: 
decoupling and budget restraint.  FAIR merits continuation, but these flaws should be fixed.￿￿
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